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CYBER-VULNERABILITIES & PUBLIC 
HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
GLYN CASHWELL, ESQ. 
INTRODUCTION 
There have been countless large-scale cyberattacks against the health care 
industry.1 Failure, degradation, denial-of-service, or integrity issues could 
significantly hamper public health emergency preparation, response, recovery, 
and mitigation efforts.  Health records are valued at over ten times the amount of 
credit cards on the black market, and the medical industry is a significant 
cybersecurity target.2 Still, the medical industry remains behind most other 
sectors in its cybersecurity posture.3  In order to recommend solutions to these 
problems (I) current cybercrime vulnerabilities and previous attacks should be 
analyzed; (II) the legal landscape of medical industry cybersecurity should be 
surveyed; and (III) law and policy recommendations are considered. 
I. CYBERSECURITY ATTACKS 
Cybercriminals have forged numerous attacks on (A) health networks and 
devices and (B) the critical infrastructures that countries rely on to prepare for, 
respond to, recover from, and mitigate the likelihood and probability of public 
health emergencies.4 
 
© 2018 Glyn Cashwell 
 1. See generally Kelly Sheridan, Major Cyberattacks on Healthcare Grew 63% in 2016, 
DARKREADNG (Dec. 22, 2016,), http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/major-cyberattacks-on-
healthcare-grew-63—in-2016/d/d-id/1327779 (detailing the increase in cyberattacks on the healthcare 
industry and vulnerabilities of today’s medical devices, patient databases, and healthcare networks).  
 2. See Caroline Humer and Jim Finkle, Your Medical Record is Worth More to Hackers than Your 
Credit Card, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-hospitals-
idUSKCN0HJ21I20140924. 
 3. John Zorabedian, Why Cybercriminals Attack Healthcare More Than any Other Industry, 
SSOPHOS, (Apr. 26, 2016), 
http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/NIST%20CSF%20to%20HIPAA%20Security%20Rule%20Cross
walk%2002-22-2016%20Final.pdf.  
 4. See generally Ashley Thomas, Hack Attack: Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of Medical 
Devices, ABA (Sept. 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/aba_health_esource/2015-
2016/september/hackattack.html (explaining the importance of hospitals and health systems improving 
their infrastructure around healthcare technology). 
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A. Cyberattacks Directed at Medical Networks or Devices 
Health care providers are vulnerable to direct attacks.5  In 2015, 113 million 
health care records were breached.6  Additionally, forty percent of all data 
breaches in the country in the last three years were associated with the health 
care industry.7  Ninety-one percent of medical providers are known cyber-
victims.8  Despite being a major target, “the healthcare industry lags behind other 
industries when it comes to implementing cybersecurity protections.”9  Health 
insurance information can be stolen for multiple reasons to include to cover 
others’ medical expenses.10  Medical records can also contain past payment 
information such as credit card or checking account information.11  Aside from 
using someone else’s accounts directly, cybercriminals can also use Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII) such as social security numbers and dates of birth 
from health records for identity theft.12 
Nefarious actors can also exploit individuals’ medical diagnoses. For 
instance, if cybercriminals obtain celebrities’ or public figures’ medical 
information during cyberattacks, they could blackmail them.13  Employers and 
lenders allegedly purchase medical information for prospective employees and 
borrowers on the black market.14  After all, employers might prefer to hire 
 
 5. Jim Finkle, Exclusive: FBI Warns Healthcare Sector Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks, REUTERS, 
(Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-healthcare-fbi-exclusiv-
idUSBREA3M1Q920140423.  
 6. HIPAA JOURNAL, OCR Issues Crosswalk Between NIST Cybersecurity Framework and HIPAA 
Security Rule 
http://www.hipaajournal.com/ocr-issues-crosswalk-between-nist-cybersecurity-framework-and-hipaa-
security-rule-832 (last accessed Nov. 20, 2017). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Dan Tynan, Report: Half of U.S. Health Care Providers Have Been Hacked, YAHOO TECH., (May 
7, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/tech/report-half-of-us-healthcare-providers-have-been-
118323228724.html. 
 9. HIPPA JOURNAL, supra note 6.  
 10. Humer & Finkle, supra note 2 (citing a case in which a patient’s stolen records were used to cover 
another person’s medical procedure and to purchase medical equipment). 
 11. See Gail Buckner, Scammers Want Your Medical Records. . .Here’s Why, FOX BUS. (Apr. 14, 
2014), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2014/04/14/scammers-want-your-medical-recordshere-
why.html (“your medical file might also include personal financial information if, for instance, you used 
your credit card to cover your co-pay.”). 
 12. See id.; ERIKA MCCALLISTER, NIST, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF 
PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) (Apr. 2010), 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-122/sp800-122.pdf. 
 13. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Charlie Sheen’s HIV Status and the Dawn of Medical-Data Blackmail, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-
health/wp/2015/11/17/charlie-sheens-hiv-status-and-the-dawn-of-medical-data-blackmail/ (reporting that 
Charlie Sheen had been blackmailed for $10 million after his HIV status fell into the hands of criminals).  
 14. See Andrea Peterson, Privacy Advocates Warn of ‘Nightmare’ Scenario as Tech Giants Consider 
Fitness Tracking, WASH. POST (May 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2014/05/19/privacy-advocates-warn-of-nightmare-scenario-as-tech-giants-consider-fitness-
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employees who do not have medical conditions that might even incidentally 
affect their work or that might increase a company’s medical insurance 
expenses.15  Lenders might take medical information into account in determining 
the likelihood that someone would repay a loan.16 
 Aside from obtaining medical information, hackers can also launch denial-
of-service attacks.17  A large-scale denial-of-service attack would likely require 
health care providers to modify their standard operating procedures.18  Such 
attacks could prevent networked medical devices and equipment from providing 
status information, resulting in reduced patient care and requiring more workers 
to measure and report information that would otherwise be available in a 
centralized location.19  Not having access to medical records could cause many 
problems, such as preventing health care staff from being able to access 
important medical information during a procedure.20  One hospital had to send 
patients to other hospitals after ransomware (malware that shuts down a network 
until funds are paid to a nefarious actor) took down their medical network.21  
Given that many areas of the country are not currently able to meet the “surge 
capacity benchmark developed by the federal Health Resources and Services 
Administration” even without large-scale distributed denial-of-service attacks, 
the impact of these attacks during a widespread health emergency would be 
disastrous.22 
Hackers also target medical devices.  Medical devices are often integrated 
within larger networks.  This allows nefarious actors who already have infiltrated 
a medical network to obtain control of the devices if they cannot attack them 
 
tracking/ (discussing fitness application devices could provide employers with access to the private 
medical data of its employees). 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. (Explaining how medical information could lead mortgage companies to partake in 
discriminatory practices).  
 17. See Robert Auger, Denial-of-Service, WEB APPLICATION SECURITY CONSORTIUM (Jan. 2010), 
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246921/Denial%20of%20Service. 
 18. See generally Sean Gallagher, Patients Diverted to Other Hospitals after Ransomware Locks 
Down Key Software, ARS TECHNICAL (Feb. 17, 2016), http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/02/la-
hospital-latest-victim-of-targeted-crypto-ransomware-attack/ (describing a cyberattack where fetal 
monitors could not properly record data). 
 19. Kelly Sheridan supra note 1 (detailing the increase in cyberattacks on the healthcare industry and 
the vulnerabilities in patient databases and healthcare networks).  
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See generally DEREK DELIA, N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND SENIOR SERV., HOSPITAL CAPACITY, 
PATIENT FLOW, AND EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT USE IN NEW JERSEY (Sept. 2007), 
http://www.nj.gov/health/rhc/documents/ed_report.pdf (explaining that the surge capacity benchmark is 
the ability of hospitals to have beds available during periods of high occupancy and citing New Jersey as 
an example of a state where certain regional hospitals are likely to have a limited number of empty beds 
relative to the population). 
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directly.23  A range of equipment, from monitoring to more critical equipment 
such as “drug infusion pumps, ventilators and external defibrillators” could be 
affected.24  Attacks to some equipment could directly lead to patient injury or 
death.25   
Specific cyber-vulnerabilities in a medical setting include (i) personally-
owned medical employee devices used to connect to networks that contain PHI 
and (ii) ‘Internet of Things’ devices. 
i. ‘Bring Your Own Device’ (BYOD) Security Issues 
The cyber-vulnerability to networks at many facilities is exacerbated by the 
fact that 88% of health care facilities, including hospitals, allow workers to bring 
their own devices to connect to their network containing PHI to provide patient 
care.26 This significantly increases vulnerabilities because health care workers 
maintain ownership of the device after their shifts.27  Many Information 
Technology (IT) departments will not have control, including monitoring and 
inventorying capabilities, of such devices.28  Mobile devices that health care 
workers connect to medical networks with might already contain backdoors or 
malware.  If so, nefarious actors might infiltrate the health care network through 
workers’ mobile devices.  IT departments generally have little to no control over 
personally-owned devices’ security configurations, such as antivirus software 
and encryption settings.29 
 
 23. See David Geer, The Internet of Things: Top Five Threats to IoT Devices, CSO (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134265/network-security/the-internet-of-things—top-five-threats-to-
iot-devices.html?page=2. 
 24. See Dina Fine Maron, A New Cyber Concern: Hack Attacks on Medical Devices, SCI. AM. (June 
25, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-new-cyber-concern-hack (reporting that “the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security highlighted one [security] weakness affecting approximately 300 
medical devices, included drug infusion pumps, ventilators and external defibrillators”). 
 25. See id. (noting that viruses could “render a device unavailable to give care”, which could result 
in risks to patients). 
 26. See PONEMON INSTITUTE, FOURTH ANNUAL BENCHMARK STUDY ON PATIENT PRIVACY & DATA 
SECURITY 12 (Mar. 2014), 
https://www.privacyrights.org/sites/privacyrights.org/files/ID%20Experts%204th%20Annual%20Patient
%20Privacy%20&%20Data%20Security%20Report%20FINAL.pdf. 
 27. See id. (explaining that most companies do not require security precautions for personal devices).  
 28. See id. (stating that criminal attacks on healthcare systems have increased through use of personal 
unsecured devices). 
 29. See id. (noting very few employers require employees to have antivirus software on their mobile 
devices).  
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ii. ‘Internet of Things’ Vulnerabilities 
Another large problem is that insecure ‘Internet of things’ devices continue 
to be added in medical facilities.30  ‘Internet of things’ are “smart” devices that 
connect to networks for remote monitoring and control.31  ‘Internet of things’ 
devices pose serious security risks because security is often not fully considered 
in early design stages; therefore, many contain known security vulnerabilities 
that are not patchable.32  The issue is that ‘Internet of things’ device 
manufacturers are generally not incentivized to develop secure devices because 
the manufacturers need to get products on the market as quickly as possible.33  
Hackers could use well-known vulnerabilities to access such insecure devices as 
a starting point to infiltrating a larger medical network.34  Obtaining access to 
this larger network could allow attackers to obtain large databases of Personal 
Health Information (PHI). 
 Many organizations’ IT departments do not detect network attacks in a 
timely manner.35  Often an attack is not discovered for at least months.36  As a 
result, cybercriminals can more easily steal massive amounts of PHI.37 
B. Infrastructure Cybersecurity Attacks 
Two large health care infrastructure dependencies during public health 
emergencies are (i) the power grid and (ii) telecommunications infrastructure.  
Both are extremely vulnerable to large-scale cyberattacks. 
 
 30. See Shaun Sutner, FDA and UL Weigh In on Security of Medical Devices, IOT AGENDA (July 
2015), http://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/feature/FDA-and-UL-weigh-in-on-security-of-
medical-devices-IoT. 
 31. See Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet Of Things’, FORBES (May 13, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-
can-understand/#c747a7068284 (explaining such Internet-connected devices include everything from 
cellphones and wearable devices to coffee makers and washing machines). 
 32. Bruce Schneier, The Internet of Things is Wildly Insecure- and Often Unpatchable, WIRED (Jan. 
6, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/01/theres-no-good-way-to-patch-the-internet-of-things-and-thats-
a-huge-problem/. 
 33. See id. at 4 (arguing that the greater rush to put equipment on the market, the more vulnerable the 
rushed equipment is to viruses and the more difficult it is to patch).  
 34. See id. (noting a large-scale malware hack of 4.5 million users on a common Brazilian DSL router 
system). 
 35. See Pierluigi Paganini, Risks and Cyber Threats to the Healthcare Industry, INFOSEC INST. (Sept. 
16, 2014), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/risks-cyber-threats-healthcare-industry/ (indicating that 
30 million Americans have had their personal health information disclosed as a result of large networks 
data breeches). 
 36. See id. (stating that many compromised providers were out of compliance because IT staff never 
detected evidence of attacks on their systems).   
 37. See id. 
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i. Power Grid Attacks 
According to information from Department of Energy, the power grid is 
hacked several times a week.38  National Security Agency (NSA) director, 
Michael Rogers, stated that at least three countries have infiltrated the U.S. power 
grid.39  In 2015, a virus called Black Energy took down Ukraine’s power grid, 
leaving 700,000 homes without power.40  Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) analysts revealed that the same virus, Black Energy, “is one of the attack 
sets periodically found on the U.S. grid.”41  In a recent physical attack in Metcalf, 
CA, vandals cut major fiber lines and fired multiple rounds into a substation, 
resulting in $15.4 million of damage to power grid equipment.42  Former Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commissioner (FERC), Jon Wellinghoff, stated that if 
similar attacks were to occur simultaneously in various places throughout the 
country, they could completely take down the U.S. power grid.43  
Public health responses are largely dependent on a reliable power grid.44  
After all, most medical equipment requires electricity, and some medications 
require refrigeration.45  Because of this, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) created a website to assist people who require electricity for 
treatment or recovery to find places that can continue to supply them power in 
their area during a large-scale power outage.46  Although most major care 
providers have back-up generators and uninterruptible power supplies, these are 
generally only provided as a stop-gap.  Hospitals and other major care providers 
 
 38. See Steve Reilly, Bracing for a Big Power Grid Attack: ‘One is too Many’, USA TODAY (Mar. 
24, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/03/24/power-grid-physical-and-cyber-attacks-
concern-security-experts/24892471/ (“More often than once a week, the physical and computerized 
security mechanisms intended to protect Americans from widespread power outages are affected by 
attacks, with less severe cyberattacks happening even more often.”). 
 39. See Katie Bo Williams, House Energy Bill Boosts Cybersecurity for Electric Grid, HILL (Dec. 3, 
2015), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/261987-house-energy-overhaul-boosts-grid-cybersecurity; 
Paul Szoldra, NSA: It’s Only a Matter of Time before Government-Backed Hackers Hit our Power Grid, 
TECH. INSIDER (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.techinsider.io/nsa-chief-infrastructure-2016-3. 
 40. See Szoldra, supra note 39 (noting that the attack used malicious software to kill power to these 
homes); see also Paul Szoldra, The scary-simple way hackers cut electricity to 700,000 homes, TECH. 
INSIDER (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/hacker-blackout-ukraine-attack-2016-1 
(explaining that 700,000 homes had their power cut). 
 41. See John Quigg, Ukraine Power Grid Attack Is Wake-Up Call; US Not Ready, BREAKING DEF. 
(Jan. 29, 2016), http://breakingdefense.com/2016/01/ukraine-power-grid-attack-is-wake-up-call-us-not-
ready/. 
 42. Reilly, supra note 38; Dan Lohrmann, How Vulnerable Is America’s Power Grid? EMERGENCY 
MGMT. (May 16, 2014), http://www.emergencymgmt.com/safety/How-Vulnerable-Americas-Power-
Grid.html. 
 43. Lohrmann, supra note 42. 
 44. See id. (noting that government response teams are reliant on local power grids).  
 45. See id.  
 46. Press Release, HHS launches GIS-based tool for health disaster readiness, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 23, 2015), http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2015/06/23/hhs-launches-gis-
based-tool-for-health-disaster-readiness.html. 
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are typically only required by code to have backup power for “functions vital to 
the protection of life and safety.”47  During Hurricane Sandy, some New York 
and New Jersey hospitals found their generators were faulty and did not activate 
during a power outage.48  The same thing happened in New Orleans hospitals 
during Hurricane Katrina, and in Connecticut and San Diego in 2011.49  
Furthermore, some generators in older hospitals are in basements, so flooding 
can damage them.50  New construction codes require generators to be above flood 
levels, but these codes do not retroactively apply to older construction.51   
Larger health provider centers extensively use electronic health records.52 
Reliable power is necessary to access these records.53  Without access to these 
electronic medical records, many medical practitioners would have to rely on 
alternative standard operating procedures such as copious, antiquated hand-
written records.54 
A longer-lasting, widespread power grid outage can also cause an increase 
in medical emergencies.55  For instance, more automobile accidents occur when 
traffic signals are inoperable.56  Furthermore, those dependent on medical care 
who require electricity will probably be unable to continue treatments from 
home.57  These, along with other indirect problems, could lead to a massive 
influx of patients that might require hospitals to operate above capacity.  If 
 
 47. See ARCHTOOLBOX, Emergency and Standby Power Systems for Buildings, 
http://www.archtoolbox.com/materials-systems/electrical/emergency-power-systems-for-buildings.html 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2016); NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 70, NAT’L ELEC. CODE (2005).  
 48. See Charles Ornstein, Why Do Hospital Generators Keep Failing? PROPUBLICA (Oct. 31, 2012), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/why-do-hospitals-generators-keep-failing. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id.  
 52. See NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., Hospitals Participating in the CMS EHR 
Incentive Program (2015), https://dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIG-Hospitals-EHR-
Incentive-Programs.php (finding that 95% of Eligible and Critical Health hospitals meaningfully use 
electronic health records). 
 53. See, e.g., Cheryl Gregg Fahrenholz et al., Plan B: A Practical Approach to Downtime Planning 
in Medical Practices, 80.11 J. OF AHIMA 34 (2009), 
http://library.ahima.org/doc?oid=95715#.WNw23hiZNsM (explaining how access to electronic health 
records is essential and describing plans that hospitals can use to continue to operate when they lose 
power). 
 54. See id. (describing how to transition to a paper process until EHR systems are back online). 
 55. See Chaamala Klinger et al., Power Outages, Extreme Events and Health: A Systematic Review 
of the Literature from 2011–2012, PLOS CURRENTS (Jan. 2, 2014), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3879211/ (reporting that power outages are associated 
with extreme events and hospitals see a higher intake of patients during extreme events). 
 56. See Seth Soffian, Irma Aftermath: Crashes Happen as Drivers Blow Through Inoperable Traffic 
Lights, NEWS-PRESS (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.news-press.com/story/news/2017/09/12/irma-crashes-
happening-drivers-blow-through-inoperable-traffic-lights/659688001/. 
 57. HHS, supra note 46. 
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combined with an imminent public health event, like a bioterrorism attack, the 
problem would be exacerbated. 
ii. Telecommunications Infrastructure  
Telecommunications networks are also susceptible to cyberattacks.  Many 
telecommunications networks are dependent on power for continued operations 
and may be unavailable in a power outage.  Telecommunications providers are a 
prime target for many cybercriminals because they transport massive amounts of 
sensitive information.58  Not only can state actors infiltrate telecommunications 
resources and surveil private communications, they might also incite a large-
scale denial-of-service attack.59  Telecommunications providers have even shut 
down “critical services” based on false information that an actor had infiltrated 
parts of their networks.60  Electronic public health record management is 
dependent on reliable telecommunications networks, as records should generally 
be accessible from multiple locations, and information could be stored on the 
Cloud.61 
Emergency responders also rely on reliable telecommunications to perform 
their jobs.62 People need to be able to reach emergency operators during medical 
emergencies. Dispatch needs reliable telecommunications to obtain incident 
information from operators and to allocate resources using a system like 
Computer-aided Dispatch (CAD).63  During a larger incident, the incident 
command post will be located some distance away from the “hot zone” of 
activity.64  Adequate telecommunications are necessary for an incident 
commander to efficiently manage resources.  Local and state emergency 
operating centers, like the Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), 
will get involved in large incidents to help effectively use local or state resources 
 
 58. See DELOITTE, Global Cyber Executive Briefing: Telecommunications (2016), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/risk/articles/Telecommunications.html (explaining how the 
telecommunications sector is extremely vulnerable to cyberattacks, while also offering large-scale data 
and personal information that is valuable for blackmail and resale).   
 59. See id. (explaining that telecom organizations store names, addresses, and financial data).  
 60. See id. 
 61. Eddie Hooper, Health Facilities Managements, Open Telecommunications (May 19, 2015), 
http://www.hfmmagazine.com/articles/1549-open-telecommunications.  
 62. See, e.g., Sharoda A. Paul et al., The Usefulness of Information and Communication Technologies 
in Crisis Response, AMIA (2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2655958/ (citing an 
Emergency Department’s statement that they received all orders through Internet telecommunications). 
 63. See id. (noting that EMS needs to utilize a technology computer-aided dispatch system that can 
ensure that all actors have consistent access to accurate information); SUNGARD PUBLIC SECTOR, 
Computer Aided Dispatch (2017), https://www.sungardps.com/solutions/onesolution/public-safety-
justice/computer-aided-dispatch/ (explaining that computer-aided dispatch software streamlines 
communication and increases officer safety). 
 64. See INCIDENT COMMAND POST PROCEDURES (Mar. 2009), 
http://www.oneonta.edu/admin/police/emergency/erp/07.pdf (describing the factors influencing the 
location of the Incident Command Post). 
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in the response and recovery phases of the emergency management cycle.65  
Reliable telecommunications with these agencies and other departments and 
jurisdictions that form the unified command or unified area command are 
essential for optimal response.66 
II. RELEVANT LEGISLATION, REGULATIONS, EXECUTIVE ORDERS (E.O.S), AND 
PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVES (PPDS) 
Because of numerous health care cyberattacks, Congress and the Office of 
the President have attempted to address the industry’s cybersecurity posture.  The 
regulatory landscape includes the (A) Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), which was passed in 1996 and emphasizes security 
planning; (B) Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
(HITECH) Act, which, among other things, extends liability to third parties and 
incentivizes the use of Electronic Health Records (EHRs); (C) Cybersecurity Act 
of 2015, which emphasizes information sharing; (D) Health Information 
Technology: Certification Criteria for Health Information Technology, which  
provides accreditation standards for Electronic Health Records (EHRs); (E) 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, which emphasizes information sharing 
between private companies and the federal government; (F) executive orders that 
emphasize the importance of critical infrastructure on national security; and (G) 
Presidential Policy Directives that create task forces and require studies be 
developed to address critical infrastructure cyber-vulnerabilities.67  The 
effectiveness of each will be addressed in turn. 
A. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
The two major components of HIPAA are (i) the privacy rule, which 
specifies what data should be protected and (ii) the security rule, which dictates 
the administrative, physical, and technical safeguards that medical practitioners 
should implement.  
 
 65. See MARYLAND EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, About MEMA, 
http://mema.maryland.gov/Pages/AboutMEMA.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2018) (describing MEMA’s 
work with FEMA to respond to disasters and emergencies occurring in Maryland). 
 66. See id. 
 67. OFFICE OF PRESS SECRETARY, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE, PPD-8, NATIONAL 
PREPAREDNESS (Mar. 30, 2011); see also OFFICE OF PRESS SECRETARY PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (Feb. 12, 2013). 
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i. Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 & 164 (2009) 
The HIPAA privacy rule specifies that covered entities need to safeguard 
Protected Health Information (PHI).68  PHI is personally identifiable 
information, such as a name or social security number, that is associated with 
medical or health information, such as current or previous illnesses, payment 
information for health care, and medical treatments.69  Covered entities are health 
care providers, health plans, or health care clearinghouses (i.e., third parties that 
deal with formatting non-standard information, such as a third party billing 
company that determines applicable billing codes before passing information to 
insurance companies).70  
ii. Security Rule, 45 CFR Part 160 and Subparts A and C of Part 164 (2009) 
HIPAA’s security rule addresses various administrative, technical, and 
physical safeguards to protect data.71  In order to be flexible, HIPAA security 
rules have several required protections that must be implemented by every 
covered entity.72  Covered entities perform their own self-assessment to 
determine if each addressable security component is “reasonable and 
appropriate.”73  If a covered entity determines that an addressable security 
component is not “reasonable and appropriate,” it either documents its rationale 
in reaching that decision or it implements an “alternative measure.”74  Out of the 
eighteen HIPAA safeguards, only six are required factors.75 
Unfortunately for victims of PHI breaches, there is no private cause of 
action for individuals under HIPAA for an individual to obtain a remedy from 
harm caused by a covered entity’s HIPAA breach (note, however, that, as 
discussed later, HITECH allows state attorney generals to bring causes of action 
for HIPAA violations on behalf state residents).76  In other words, a private 
 
 68. See HHS, Guidance Regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health Information 
in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule 
(2010), http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See 45 CFR § 160.103 (2013); HHS, Covered Entities and Business Associates, 
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/covered-entities/index.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2016). 
 71. See HHS, Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/security/laws-regulations/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2016). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA SECURITY RULE (last visited Apr. 
28, 2016), http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/. 
 75. HIPAA Security Series: 1 Security 101 for Covered Entities; DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
10–11 https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/ 
securityrule/security101.pdf (revised Mar. 2007). 
 76. I.S. v. Wash. Univ., No. 4:11CV235SNLJ, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Mo. June 14, 2011); see also Legal 
Alert: HIPAA May Provide Basis for State Law Private Cause of Action, MCGUIREWOODS (June 23, 
2011), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2011/6/HIPAA-May-Provide-Basis-
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individual cannot bring a civil action against a covered entity under HIPAA for 
HIPAA violations.77  An individual may have other causes of action that can be 
brought under other laws, like state negligence claims.  In negligence cases, a 
violation of HIPAA might be used as evidence to help show the relevant standard 
of care and not being HIPAA-compliant might be evidence of the breach of that 
standard of care.78  Even though private citizens can file complaints to the Office 
of Civil Rights (OCR) within HHS, OCR is responsible for levying fines upon 
covered entities that violate the statute.79   
Some security advocates are worried that covered entities are so concerned 
with ensuring they are HIPAA-compliant that they do not have funding and 
resources to implement other security controls that could be more effective 
against medical identity theft.80  Security expert Reece Hirsch with Morgan, 
Lewis, & Bockius concludes that “mere compliance with the HIPAA Security 
Rule is not sufficient if current cyber risks are not being taken into account.”81   
B. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
(HITECH) Act 
The HITECH Act extends HIPAA requirements and liability to include 
business associates in addition to covered entities.82  Business associates are third 
parties that implement various solutions on behalf of covered entities.83 
The HITECH ACT also encourages covered entities to develop Electronic 
Health Records (EHRs).84  The U.S. government believed EHRs would reduce 
 
for-State-Law-Private-Cause-of-Action.aspx (“HIPAA does not create a private right of action, under 
federal law.”). 
 77. See Kane Russell, Coleman Logan PC, Is There a Private Cause of Action for HIPPA Violations?, 
LEXOLOGY (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a5bc1a0f-557a-4bf1-8cd3-
1498c872a4dc. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See HIPAA What to Expect, DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/filing-a-complaint/what-to-expect/index.html; Cignet Health Fined a $4.3M 
Civil Money Penalty for HIPAA Privacy Rule Violations, DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 11, 2016), 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/examples/cignet-
health/index.html?language=es (describing how HHS fined Cignet health $4.3 million for HIPAA privacy 
rule violations). 
 80. See Bob Violino, 7 Ways to Work Around Security Compliance Problems, CSO (Jan. 6, 2014), 
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134254/it-audit/7-ways-to-work-around-security-compliance-
problems.html (“the misunderstanding related to HIPAA can have a negative impact on certain business 
processes, affect application performance and even cause users to bypass certain controls because they’re annoyed 
at security”). 
 81. Beth Walsh, Top Legal Issues in Healthcare Include Cybersecurity, HIPAA, Telemedicine, CLIN. 
INNOVATION + TECH. (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.clinical-innovation.com/topics/ehr-emr/top-legal-
issues-healthcare-include-cybersecurity-hipaa-telemedicine. 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 17931 (2012). 
 83. See id.; HHS, supra note 68. 
 84. See id. 
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health care costs and improve care.85  EHRs have the potential to prevent 
duplicative tests and allow medical providers to transfer records between each 
other to obtain a more wholistic picture of patients’ conditions.86  The 
government initially provided covered entities with incentive payments if they 
“meaningfully” used certified EHRs in their practice.87  Now providers that do 
not “meaningfully use” EHR systems must pay the government a percentage of 
their Medicare/Medicaid revenues.88 
The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology 
(ONCHIT) delegates its responsibility to certify EHRs to third parties.89  This 
certification process does not appear to be rigorous, as many certified EHRs have 
serious usability and security issues.90  As a result, many argue HITECH has 
largely failed to meet its goal of providing a more effective, efficient system of 
records.91   
The EHR incentive/penalty program may have incentivized covered 
entities to convert to EHRs quickly without covered entities fully considering 
applicable safeguards that should be put in place as part of EHR 
implementation.92  By doing so, appropriate safeguards were not designed into 
some EHR systems from the initial design development stage.93  Adding 
technical security safeguards after the final design stage is typically extremely 
expensive, ineffective, and can make the entire system bulkier and less user-
 
 85. Benefits of Electronic Health Records (EHRs), HEALTHIT.GOV (last updated Jul. 30, 2015), 
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/benefits-electronic-health-records-ehrs (Jul. 30, 2015); 
see also Sue Bowman, Impact of Electronic Health Record Systems on Information Integrity: Quality and 
Safety Implications, PERSP. HEALTH INFO. MGMT. (Oct. 1, 2013), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3797550/. 
 86. See Health Information Exchange (HIE): What is HIE?, HEALTHIT.GOV 
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/health-information-exchange/what-hie, (May 12, 2014) 
(discussing health information exchanges set up to exchange EHR between physicians, leading to benefits 
including reduced duplicative testing). 
 87. See HHS, Meaningful Use Regulations, https://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-
implementers/meaningful-use-regulations (last visited Apr. 28, 2016). 
 88. See id. 
 89. See HHS, About the ONC Health ITSec Health IT Certification Program (2016), 
https://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/about-onc-health-it-certification-program. 
 90. See David Blumenthal, Stimulating the Adoption of Health Information Technology, 360 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1477, 1479 (AprIl, 9, 2009) (noting that many certified EHRs are neither user-friendly nor 
designed to meet quality and efficiency standards.). 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. 
 93. See Joseph Goedert, Encryption Remains Afterthought for Meaningful Use, HEALTH DATA 
MGMT. (Oct. 8, 2015), htttps://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/encryption-remains-afterthought-
for-meaningful-use (stating that HITECH failure to mandate encryption lead to security concerns); see 
also Joe Marion, Granting Access: An EHR Security Risk? HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (June. 1, 2009), 
http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/blogs/jlmblog/granting-access-ehr-security-risk (noting that 
cardiovascular patient information EHR database did not have privacy safeguards designed into its system 
when developed).  
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friendly.94  The cost of redesigning an EHR system to address security flaws can 
be cost-prohibitive.95 
The HITECH Act provides a potential way for patients harmed by a covered 
entity’s violation of HIPAA to recover.  However, it only allows a state’s 
attorney general to bring class action suits on behalf of patients in the state.96  
Therefore, it still limits the ability of patients to recover from harm caused by 
covered entities’ HIPAA violations. 
The HITECH Act also does not require covered entities or business 
associates to report a lost or stolen device to HHS if data was encrypted by an 
approved encryption algorithm.97  Encrypting mobile devices with an algorithm 
accepted by OCR, therefore, can save covered entities large sums of money in 
fines or related lawsuits.98   
C. Cybersecurity Act of 2015 
The Cybersecurity Act consists of (i) general provisions that apply to 
additional industries besides health care and (ii) provisions that are specific to 
the health care industry. 
i. General Provisions 
The Cybersecurity Act of 2015, also referred to as the Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act (CISA), primarily focuses on the ability of private 
entities to share cyber-threat information with the government.99  The act was a 
response to the large Office of Personnel Management (OPM) data breach, and 
 
 94. See Ann Cavoukian and Richard C. Alvarez, Embedding Privacy into the Design of EHRs to 
Enable Multiple Functionalities – Win/Win, INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONER (Mar. 2, 2012), 
https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/Resources/pbd-ehr-e_1.pdf (noting the advantages of 
embedding privacy as a first consideration of EHR systems). 
 95. See How Much is This Going to Cost Me, HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/providers-
professionals/faqs/how-much-going-cost-me (last visited Apr. 17, 2016) (noting the high cost of 
redesigning, purchasing, and installing an EHR system). 
 96. See Health Information Technology for Clinical and Economic Health Act Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
123 Stat. 225, 279 (2009); Barbara Fox, Mobile Medical Apps: Where Health and Internet Privacy Law 
Meet, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 193, 215 (2014). 
 97. See Office of Civil Rights, Guidance to Render Unsecured Protected Health Information 
Unusable, Unreadable, or Indecipherable to Unauthorized Individuals (July 26, 2013), 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/breach-notification/guidance/index.html. 
 98. See Mike Semel, HIPAA Doesn’t Require Data Encryption, but you Should, 4MEDAPPROVED, 
(Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.4medapproved.com/hitsecurity/hipaa-data-encryption/ (“The HITECH Act of 
2009 modified the HIPAA data breach rule by stating that if a device is lost or stolen, the loss is not 
reportable as a HIPAA data breach if the data is encrypted in compliance with data encryption guidance 
from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).”). 
 99. See Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 29 Stat. 694, 694–744 
(2015); Suz Redfearn, Einstein Efforts Accelerate Under the Spotlight of OPM Breach, FED. TIMES (Aug. 
10, 2015), http://www.federaltimes.com/story/government/cybersecurity/2015/08/10/opm-breach-kick-
starts-einstein-efforts/31424351/. 
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it designates DHS as the government point of contact for information sharing 
with the private sector.100  Businesses are required “to use technical means” to 
scrub personally identifiable information before it is transferred to DHS.101  
Despite the safeguards that DHS applies to the data, privacy advocates are 
concerned that the statute enables the government to spy on U.S. citizens.102  
Businesses are not given incentives to ensure that personal information is 
correctly scrubbed from the data forwarded to DHS as businesses are relieved 
from liability by showing that the information they sent was “directly related and 
necessary” to assess a cybersecurity threat.103  Some have argued that the act’s 
overall effect will be to infringe on citizens’ privacy rights without providing 
security mechanisms to prevent harm to citizens from data breaches because this 
“directly related and necessary” standard is vague.104  The government argues 
that the act allows them to better provide businesses with information about how 
they can secure data and provide effective security solutions.105 
Personal Health Information that entities share with DHS could contain 
particularly private information.  Citizens are concerned that covered entities and 
business associates that share such information with DHS might not adequately 
remove personally identifiable information or that DHS could use data mining 
techniques to uncover the identities associated with underlying health 
information.106 Furthermore, citizens question how well the government 
safeguards personal information after the OPM breach.107  If DHS were to handle 
citizens’ personal health information in a similar manner that OPM handled its 
data, DHS could be indirectly responsible for medical identity theft.  By even 
 
 100. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, supra note 99; Paul Rosenzweig, The 
Cybersecurity Act of 2015, LAWFARE (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cybersecurity-act-
2015. 
 101. Rosenzweig, supra note 100. 
 102. LETTER FROM CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS TO CONGRESS (Dec. 17, 2015), 
http://www.ala.org/advocacy/sites/ala.org.advocacy/files/content/advleg/federallegislation/12-17-
15%20Coalition%20Letter%20to%20Members%20of%20Congress%20urging 
%20opposition%20to%20the%20Cybersecurity%20Act%20of%202015.pdf. 
 103. Jadzia Butler, CISA’s Interim Guidelines: A Good Start, but with Lingering Privacy Concerns, 
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Feb. 26, 2016), https://cdt.org/blog/cisas-interim-guidelines-a-good-
start-but-with-lingering-privacy-concerns/. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Lauren Walker, Senate Passes Controversial CISA Bill Letting Companies Share 
Cybersecurity Information with Government, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.newsweek.com/senate-passes-controversial-cisa-bill-companies-share-cyber-security-
387785 (noting that by allowing the sharing of information, the government will be able to better 
coordinate with private companies and improve cyberattack responses). 
 106. Butler, supra note 103. 
 107. See Zachary Figueroa, Time to Rethink Cybersecurity Reform: The OPM Data Breach and the 
Case for Centralized Cybersecurity Infrastructure, 24 CATHOLIC U. J. L. & TECH 433, 434 (2016), 
available at 
https://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article
=1016&context=jlt. 
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obtaining and storing such information, DHS may become a big cyber target.  If 
cyber-threat data is not properly handled and stored securely, citizens’ 
information might be more vulnerable to cybercriminals than ever before. 
ii. Health Care-Specific Provisions 
The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 has three health care-specific provisions.108  
The first provision provides that cyber-threat information be shared with entities 
across the health care industry.  Such sharing should be especially beneficial to 
smaller providers.109  Second, the act defines the cybersecurity roles and 
responsibilities of each HHS department.110  It creates a HHS task force to 
identify common cyber-threats in the health care sector and to incorporate best 
practices from other industries.111  Third, it mandates that HHS create 
cybersecurity guidelines for covered entities and business associates.112  How 
helpful these guidelines could be to smaller providers will ultimately depend on 
the usability of the information provided to practitioners.  If the guidelines 
specify automated programs that providers with limited technical capabilities can 
install and utilize, then they may be very useful.  Unfortunately, a lot of the 
information that agencies have provided in the past is abstract because it also 
must be flexible.  For instance, National Institute of Standards and Technology’s 
cybersecurity framework only provides references to bulky standards to 
implement various security components.113  HHS’s “Guide to Privacy and 
Security of Public Health Information” contains a cybersecurity section, but it 
does not recommend architectures or specific technology.114  HHS’s 
cybersecurity website focuses on developing security plans and risk 
assessments.115  HHS’s “Top 10 Tips for Cybersecurity in Health Care” is a step 
in the right direction, but even that references unwieldy standards such as 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) “Special Publication 
800-88, Guidelines for Media Sanitation” and uses terminology that many non-
technical workers would probably not understand.116  HHS’s cyber-attack 
 
 108. See Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, Analysis: Cybersecurity Law’s Impact on Healthcare: HIMSS 
Legislative Expert Outlines Key Provisions and Their Implications, GOVINFOSECURITY (Dec. 22, 2015), 
http://www.govinfosecurity.com/interviews/analysis-cybersecurity-laws-impact-on-healthcare-i-3027. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id.  
 111. See id. 
 112. See id.  
 113. See NIST, FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (Feb. 12, 
2014), available at http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf. 
 114. ONCHIT, GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION, 30 (Apr. 
2015), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/privacy/privacy-and-security-guide.pdf. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See NIST, SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800–88, GUIDELINES FOR MEDIA SANITIZATION (Dec. 2014), 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-88r1.pdf; HHS, Top 10 Tips for 
Cybersecurity in Health Care (Jan. 12, 2015). 
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checklist contains guidance that even non-technical professionals should be able 
to comprehend and implement, but this is mostly useful only if an attack has 
actually been discovered and only after an attack has occurred.117  HHS should 
focus on providing specific technical guidance in terms non-technical people can 
understand to properly address cyber-threats beyond the requirements to simply 
comply with HIPAA. 
D. HHS, Health Information Technology: Certification Criteria for Health 
Information Technology (45 CFR Part 170, Subpart C) 
HHS, “Health Information Technology: Initial Set of Standards, 
Implementation Specifications, and Certification Criteria for Electronic Health 
Record Technology” specifies EHR certification criteria.118  Specific 
requirements include authentication, access control, laboratory test result 
integration, audit logs, emergency access, and electronic interfaces to allow for 
communication with public health departments.119   
The final rule for EHR Incentive Program for Stage 3 only mentioned that 
encryption should be included in risk analyses.  Therefore, the government does 
not mandate EHR encryption.120  The rule also requires administrative and 
physical safeguards that are already required under HIPAA.121 
The Final Rules for 2015 Edition Health IT Certification Criteria explicitly 
addressed requirements to improve interoperability of EHR systems to provide 
better exchange of information with other providers and with patients.122 
E. Executive Order (E.O.s) 13010 and 13636: Critical Infrastructure Security 
Executive Orders (E.O.s) 13010 and 13636 highlight the importance of 
critical infrastructure to national security.123  E.O. 13010 creates a President’s 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and identifies cyber-threats to 
the country’s infrastructure.  That order emphasizes critical infrastructure’s role 
in maintaining economic prosperity and national security.124  President Obama 
reemphasized the importance of securing critical infrastructure in E.O. 13636.125  
 
 117. See, My Entity Just Experienced a Cyber-Attack! What Do we Do Now?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUM. SERVS (June 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cyber-attack-checklist-06-2017.pdf. 
 118. See 42 CFR § 412, 42 CFR § 495. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See CMS FACT SHEET: EHR Incentive Programs in 2015 and Beyond, CMS (Oct. 6, 2015), 
https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-10-
06-2.html. 
 123. See Exec. Order No. 13,636, 3 C.F.R. 13636 (2013). 
 124. See Exec. Order No. 13,010, 3 C.F.R. 13010 (1996), available at 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-1997-title3-vol1/pdf/CFR-1997-title3-vol1-eo13010.pdf. 
 125. Exec. Order No. 13,636, supra, note 123. 
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That order promotes cybersecurity information sharing between private and 
public sectors, orders the government to create a cybersecurity framework for 
critical infrastructure, and calls for incentives to critical infrastructure providers 
that promote robust cybersecurity practices.  
Both (a) NIST’s Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity and (b) DHS’s Cybersecurity Evaluation Tool came out of these 
executive orders.126 
i. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Framework for 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
NIST’s Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity is a 
good first step in identifying relevant standards for defensive cybersecurity 
measures in various sectors.127  It provides standards that can be used by any 
critical infrastructure industry.128  The government does not mandate that critical 
infrastructure providers comply with the framework, and it provides companies 
with extensive flexibility in determining how to implement security solutions.129  
At the same time, the framework does not identify specific example solutions or 
architectures that providers could implement.130  
The government created a crosswalk to map parts of HIPAA’s security rule 
to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to assist the health care industry in 
complying with both.131  Covered entities will still have to expend significant 
effort to determine how to implement technical cybersecurity measures based on 
bulky standards set by the crosswalk lists.132  After all, instead of providing 
detailed examples of technical solutions to consider, the crosswalk contains 
references to HIPAA and general standards.133 
ii. DHS Cybersecurity Evaluation Tool 
The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-
CERT) provides assessments for critical infrastructure services at no charge.134  
It also provides a Cybersecurity Evaluation Tool.135  The tool is focused on 
helping an organization develop a security plan and identify vulnerabilities 
 
 126. Id.; Exec. Order No. 13,010, supra, note 124. 
 127. HIPPA JOURNAL, supra note 6. 
 128. See Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, S. 1353, 113th Cong. (2014), available at 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1353; NIST, supra note 113. 
 129. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, supra note 99; NIST, supra  note 116. 
 130. Id. 
 131. HIPAA JOURNAL, supra note 6. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See DHS, ASSESSMENTS, https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Assessments (last visited Apr. 29, 2016). 
 135. See id. 
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instead of suggesting specific technical security solutions.136  For instance, the 
tool assists users in documenting their network configurations, in obtaining a 
listing of general security standards, in reviewing administrative safeguards, and 
in performing a risk assessment.137 
F. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274: Voluntary 
Public-private Partnership for Cybersecurity 
The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 calls for National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop “standards and procedures to cost-
effectively reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure.”138  This was largely 
implemented in NIST’s “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity” that was also required by Executive Order (E.O.) 13636.139 
The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 also called for specific 
government departments to create cybersecurity research and development 
plans.140  Under this approach, both HHS and Department of Energy (DoE), in 
collaboration with NIST, are responsible for creating cybersecurity plans every 
four years.141  The act also calls for the government to incentivize cybersecurity 
education by granting scholarships and for NIST to develop cybersecurity 
training programs.142 
G. Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) and 21 (PPD-21) 
Presidential Policy Directives 8 and 21 identify cybersecurity threats to 
critical infrastructure as national security vulnerabilities that must be addressed. 
PPD-8 called for a Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA), which 
considered the most pertinent natural, cyber, terrorist, and health emergency 
threats.143  The SNRA determines which threats pose the largest risks and 
provides preparation, response, mitigation, and recovery recommendations for 
these national threats.144  Most of the SNRA results are classified because there 
are security concerns that adversaries could use SNRA information to forge a 
 
 136. See DHS, Cybersecurity Evaluation Tool, https://ics-cert.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/FactSheets/ICS-CERT_FactSheet_CSET_S508C.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 
2016). 
 137. See id. 
 138. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, supra note 99. 
 139. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, supra note 99; NIST, supra note 116. 
 140. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, supra note 99. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See DHS, THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF PPD 8: A 
COMPREHENSIVE RISK-BASED APPROACH TOWARD A SECURE AND RESILIENT NATION (Dec. 2011), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-strategic-national-risk-assessment-ppd8.pdf. 
 144. See id. 
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more successful attack against the nation.145  However, general information from 
the SNRA is available to the public.146  The President mandated that the SNRA 
be created in order to define a National Preparedness Goal. 
PPD-21 focuses on the importance of infrastructure security to the overall 
security of the country and recommends an all-hazards approach to ensure 
critical infrastructure resiliency.147  PPD-21 recommends emergency managers 
consider degraded power grid conditions and communication systems during 
planning processes.148  President Obama dictated that these recommendations 
should be included in an updated National Infrastructure Protection Plan.149  
PPD-21 also promotes mechanisms for private entities to share situational 
awareness information with the federal government.150  In order for the 
government to assess information from infrastructure providers, PPD-21 calls for 
a “system-of-systems” evaluation to analyze the dependencies critical 
infrastructure systems have on each other and on national security.151 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current regulations, laws, PPDs, and EOs are insufficient to avert 
numerous successful cybersecurity attacks.  In particular the laws, regulations, 
PPDs, and EOs do not generally provide enough incentives for providers to 
improve their cybersecurity posture.  The following recommendations would 
address this: (A) the EHR accreditation process should include rigorous security 
and interoperability scrutiny; (B) HHS should modify their regulatory approach 
to increase the number of required security rule safeguards and to provide 
covered entities/business associates incentives to improve their cybersecurity 
posture; and (C) emergency management should become more integrated with 
the cybersecurity community. 
A. EHR Accreditation Should Involve More Security and Interoperability 
Scrutiny 
Because most EHRs have numerous cyber-vulnerabilities, ONCHIT should 
increase the rigor its third parties apply in their “meaningful use” EHR 
accreditations.  This can be accomplished by ensuring specific security controls 
are implemented- not just considered in a risk assessment. 
 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE, Presidential Policy Directive No. 
21 (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-
directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. 
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ONCHIT should require that organizations implement essential security 
safeguards in their EHR systems.152  Many accredited systems do not contain 
sufficient security controls or meet usability standards.153  ONCHIT should 
verify that the user’s authentication, accounting, and authorization system is set 
up, there are mechanisms for data integrity, and that data is adequately 
encrypted.154  ONCHIT should also ensure that pertinent physical security 
measures are implemented.155  An example of a physical security measure is 
controlling physical access to critical servers that contain information protected 
by the privacy rule.156  ONCHIT should also ensure that there are mechanisms 
in place to prevent employees from downloading large datasets of PHI that they 
then could, either intentionally or inadvertently, provide to adversaries.  
ONCHIT should also provide more scrutiny during usability tests.  
ONCHIT should consider creating a certification checklist that adequately 
represents functionality that EHR systems should contain.  The fact that so many 
systems have been accredited that lack basic usability and interoperability 
standards is an embarrassment.  Initially, it might cost more to adopt thorough 
accreditation processes.  However, the potential to automate EHR testing could 
decrease long-term costs and meet the goals of HITECH.  ONCHIT is trying to 
address these interoperability issues by working with industry to develop and 
improve standards and has developed an interoperability roadmap, but there is 
still significant work before EHR systems truly interoperate with one another.157 
B. Modify Law and Regulatory Framework to Provide Covered Entities and 
Business Associates with Incentives to Better Secure their Systems 
HIPAA provides health care providers flexibility in allowing them to 
determine if business considerations warrant addressing many security 
safeguards.  At the same time, HIPAA does not allow for a private cause of action 
 
 152. Medicare and Medicaid Programs, supra note 118.  
 153. See Bowman, supra note 85; Blumenthal, supra note 90. 
 154. Medicare and Medicaid Programs, supra note 118. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Robert H. Dolin et al., Setting the Standard: EHR Quality Reporting Rises in Prominence 
Due to Meaningful Use, J. OF AHIMA 85 (Jan. 2014), http://library.ahima.org/doc?oid=300255 (“To 
determine quality of care, one must analyze end-to-end EHR processes—from data capture at the point of 
care to electronic reporting—and the role of standardized data in determining quality of care. The Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has been taking a leadership role in the promotion of the use 
of standards through an open process that engages measure developers, clinician users, EHR vendors, 
professional societies, and other key stakeholders… Such standards are a prerequisite for EHR 
functionality and are a foundational component of the strategy for quality reporting from EHRs.  CMS, 
recognizing this foundational role, has taken a leadership position as evidenced through their sponsorship 
of several key initiatives, including standards development and convening a multi-stakeholder 
collaboration to improve these standards.”); ONCHIT, Connecting Health and Care for the Nation, 
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/hie-interoperability/nationwide-interoperability-roadmap-
final-version-1.0.pdf. 
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when covered entities and business associates inadequately protect PHI (note, 
however, that, as discussed above, HITECH allows for the state attorney general 
to bring a cause of action under HIPAA on behalf of state’s’ residents).  Currently 
there are two primary options for those harmed by a HIPAA violation to recover: 
(1) use the entity’s breach of the HIPAA security rule to show a breach of duty 
in a “negligence per se” or other tort state claim, as supported by I.S. v. 
Washington Univ. or (2) request that the state attorney general institute a class 
action on behalf of the state’s citizens, but the state attorney general retains 
discretion over whether to bring the suit.158  Note, however, that courts are not 
bound by I.S. v. Washington Univ. for PHI breach negligence per se cases, as it 
was decided at the district court level, and it was only a decision to not dismiss 
and to remand to state court, as the cause of action was a state “negligence per 
se” claim.159 
Continued large data breaches, especially by insurance companies, imply 
that the fact that there is no private cause of action under HIPAA for breaches 
does not provide a significant incentive for covered entities and business 
associates to appropriately safeguard PHI.160  In addition to focusing on whether 
a covered entity has created a security plan and considered addressable issues, 
laws should also probably require that ONCHIT or another agency provide more 
clear-cut security requirements and regulations that can be updated regularly.  
Specific changes to the current regulatory framework that could improve health 
cybersecurity include (i) banning medical practitioners from allowing employees 
to connect directly to networks containing PHI; (ii) scrutinizing ‘Internet of 
things’ (IoT) devices and IoT settings; (iii) requiring encryption whenever 
entities handle or transmit patient data; (iv) allowing for a private cause of action 
with a presumption of causation in data breaches cases; (v) providing security 
rankings for covered entities and business associates; (vi) disseminating and 
encouraging use of automated security test tools; and (vii) discouraging 
collection of non-pertinent patient information. 
i. HHS Should Ban ‘Bring Your Own Device’ (BYOD) Models 
HHS should ban employees from using their own devices, versus those 
owned and managed by a medical facility’s IT department, to access networks 
that contain PHI.  88% of health care organizations permit employees to use their 
own mobile devices to access health care networks that might contain PHI, and 
 
 158. I.S. v. Washington Univ., supra note 76; see also MCGUIREWOODS, supra note 76; Fox, supra 
note 96. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Elise Viebeck, Regulator Dings Premera over Breach Notification Wait, HILL (Mar. 17, 
2015), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/236002-regulator-dings-premera-over-breach-notification-
wait; Michael Hiltzik, Anthem is Warning Consumers about its Huge Data Breach. Here’s a Translation, 
LA TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-anthem-is-warning-
consumers-20150306-column.html#page=1. 
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many of these covered entities do not seem to appreciate the risks associated with 
their BYOD policies.161  Compounding the problem, many mobile applications 
that employees load on their mobile devices can also leak PHI from the health 
network.162 
The biggest problem with allowing employees to access health networks 
with their own devices is accountability.  Health care administrators typically 
will not be able to access an employee’s mobile device after he or she has left 
the facility.  Administrators might not be able to ensure that employees’ mobile 
devices incorporate the most up-to-date security updates, incorporate encryption 
capabilities, or contain authentication, auditing, and authorization capabilities.  
If an employee’s non-password-protected device contains PHI and it is 
subsequently stolen, a nefarious actor could obtain and illicitly use that PHI.  
Even with password protection, administrators cannot ensure that information 
stored on employees’ mobile devices is encrypted.  As a result, a cybercriminal 
might be able to obtain information from an unencrypted hard drive on a 
password-protected device. Criminals can break weak passwords with dictionary 
or brute force attacks.163  These attack programs are “widely available tools that 
utilize wordlists and smart rulesets to intelligently and automatically guess user 
passwords.”164  Even worse, all of this could occur without the IT administrator’s 
knowledge.  After all, employees are generally unlikely to report thefts of 
personally-owned mobile device to their employers’ system administrators.   
At least when IT administrators maintain control of mobile devices, they 
can require accountability for lost devices, disable USB ports to prevent 
employees from transferring data stores of PHI and other information, control 
the applications that are installed on devices, ensure that data is encrypted both 
 
 161. See PONEMON INSTITUTE, FOURTH ANNUAL BENCHMARK STUDY ON PATIENT PRIVACY & DATA 
SECURITY 12 (Mar. 2014), 
https://www.privacyrights.org/sites/privacyrights.org/files/ID%20Experts%204th%20Annual%20Patient
%20Privacy%20&%20Data%20Security%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (“The BYOD usage continues to rise 
despite the concerns about employee negligence and the lack of security for mobile devices. Nearly 88 
percent of organizations permit medical staff to use their own mobile devices to access their organization’s 
networks and services like email.  The most worrying aspect is that nearly 50 percent of organizations are 
not aware of the risks related to BYOD, and only a limited portion of organizations require their employees 
to adopt proper countermeasures like anti-malware.”). 
 162. Lisa Phifer, Leaky Enterprise: Data Loss Tops Mobile Security Threats, TECHTARGET, 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Leaky-enterprise-Data-loss-tops-mobile-security-threats 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2016) (According to Michael Raggo, director of security research at MobileIron and 
co-author of Data Hiding, “‘Our research shows that even legitimate apps can expose PII [personally 
identifiable information] or PHI [protected health information] by embedding libraries that have some sort 
of adware or data harvesting capability.’”). 
 163. See Chris Hoffman, Brute-Force Attacks Explained: How All Encryption is Vulnerable, HOW TO 
GEEK (July 6, 2013), http://www.howtogeek.com/166832/brute-force-attacks-explained-how-all-
encryption-is-vulnerable/. 
 164. See Mark Burnett, Blocking Brute Force Attacks, UVA (2007), 
https://www.cs.virginia.edu/~csadmin/gen_support/brute_force.php. 
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when it is at rest and when it is being transmitted over networks, and require that 
passwords meet security requirements. 
ii. Regulatory Framework Should Scrutinize ‘Internet of Things’ Devices 
‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) devices are notorious for having excessive 
security vulnerabilities because many of the products were not designed with 
security in mind.165  Many also do not even provide adequate security patches 
for known vulnerabilities.166  IoT devices that do not contain adequate security 
controls can be vulnerable to direct attacks.  These device attacks can cause them 
to not operate as intended, and patient injury or death may result.167  IoT devices 
are also susceptible to denial-of-service attacks, rendering devices unavailable 
when needed.168 
The ‘Internet of things’ offers many benefits.169  For instance, maintenance, 
monitoring, and status information can often be relayed to a centralized IT 
system and to appropriate parties.170  These benefits can help automate health 
care by allowing the aggregation of information from disparate devices onto a 
single display and providing opportunities for improvements in health care by 
alerting staff to anomalous patient conditions quickly.171 Network 
administrators, however, should be extremely cautious about integrating 
‘Internet of things’ devices into their networks if the devices are insecure.  
‘Internet of things’ devices may offer cybercriminals an insecure node that can 
be used to infiltrate the rest of the network and obtain critical PHI.172 
HHS should consider providing security ratings and important patching 
information for ‘Internet of things’ devices that are commonly used in the 
medical field.  The FBI recommends that IT administrators ensure IoT device 
default passwords are changed to strong passwords, Universal Plug and Play 
Support on network devices are disabled, and IoT devices are put on their own 
enclave, which is a protected network set off from other networks using a 
firewall.173 
 
 165. Schneier, supra note 32. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Morgan, supra note 31. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Schneier, supra note 32. 
 173. See Erin McCann, FBI Issues Alert for IoT Device Security, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Sept. 16, 
2015), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/fbi-issues-alert-iot-device-security (“The FBI offered a 
list of recommendations. 1. Keep up-to-date with security patches for these devices. 2. Ditch any default 
passwords you may still have and make them stronger: ‘Do not use the default password determined by 
the device manufacturer,’ since many can be found online. 3. Disable UPnP on routers 4. Isolate IoT 
devices on their own protected networks.”). 
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iii. Encryption Requirements Should Be Required Under HIPAA and for 
EHR Accreditation 
At a minimum, covered entities and business associates should encrypt all 
PHI before transmitting or storing it.  The “eMedicare and Medicaid Electronic 
Health Records (EHRs) Incentive Program; Stage 3 and Modifications to 
Meaningful Use in 2015 through 2017” specifies that encryption should be 
considered in a risk analysis, but it does not require EHR systems to implement 
encryption for accreditation.174  The fact that encryption was not an EHR 
requirement was mentioned in official comments to the EHR Incentive Program 
rule, and CMS responded by stating that it was not going to add an encryption 
requirement to the rule.175 
iv. Injured Parties Should Be Allowed to Bring Private Causes of Action 
Under HIPAA 
Allowing private causes of action under HIPAA for PHI breaches in 
addition to allowing a state attorney general to bring them ’might provide 
monetary incentives for covered entities and business associates to provide more 
rigorous security precautions.  Patients sometimes cannot recover in a negligence 
claim from a PHI breach because they cannot show that a particular defendant 
was responsible for the data breach that caused their medical identity to be 
stolen.176  For instance, the harm a plaintiff suffered could have been caused by 
a data breach by numerous other actors other than the defendant.177  In Kahle v. 
Litton Loan Servicing, LP, the plaintiff’s negligence action alleged that Litton 
negligently stored hard drives containing customer personal information that 
were later stolen.178  The Court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that plaintiff could 
not establish proximate cause because  
even if Kahle had established that the unauthorized use of her personal 
information had occurred following the theft. . ., her claims would 
have failed because she could not have established that Litton’s 
alleged actions were the proximate cause of the unauthorized use of 
information.  Like many consumers, Kahle disclosed her personal 
information to third parties on a regular basis.179 
 
 174. See Meaningful Use Definition & Objectives, HHS (Feb. 6, 2015), 
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/meaningful-use-definition-objectives; Medicare and 
Medicaid Programs, supra note 118. 
 175. Medicare and Medicaid Programs, supra note 118. 
 176. See Jonah Comstock, What the New HIPAA Means for Digital Health Access, MOBIHEALTHNEWS 
(Jan. 28, 2013), http://mobihealthnews.com/20039/what-the-new-hipaa-means-for-digital-health-access. 
 177. See id. 
 178. 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 706-07 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 
 179. R. Bruce Allensworth et al., Recent Federal Court Decision Bolsters Growing Line of Cases 
Dismissing Class Action Claims for Alleged “Identity Theft,” K&L GATES (July 26, 2007), 
http://www.klgates.com/recent-federal-court-decision-bolsters-growing-line-of-cases-dismissing-class-
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Furthermore, in some courts, plaintiffs cannot recover simply because their 
data was breached in a negligence action as they must show “injury-in-fact.”  In 
Ruiz v. Gap, a cybercriminal stole two laptops and obtained sensitive information 
for approximately 750,000 prior job applicants.180  That information included 
applicants’ mothers’ maiden names, drivers’ license numbers, and social security 
numbers.181  In that case, the court held that data breach victims did not show all 
elements of a negligence claim because divulging personal information, without 
associated monetary loss, did not amount to an “injury-in-fact.”182  Similarly, the 
plaintiff’s contract claim for breach of the privacy policy failed because he could 
not show economic loss due to that breach.183 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA held that to “establish Article III 
standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; 
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable 
ruling.’”184  A circuit split has emerged in applying Clapper to data breach cases 
with some circuits finding that plaintiffs have standing solely by alleging their 
information was stolen and with other circuits requiring plaintiffs to allege more 
particularized injuries associated with the breach of their information to have 
standing.185 
If an individual direct cause of action under HIPAA were permitted under 
law and if courts did not require proof that a patient suffered harm from PHI theft 
from the negligence of a specific covered entity or business associate, then it 
would alleviate a significant burden from plaintiffs in the current legal data 
breach patchwork (i.e., standing and the injury/causation elements in a 
negligence case).186   
Another option is to allow plaintiffs that suffered harm from medical 
identity theft to have a rebuttable presumption in a negligence action that a 
company that had a disclosed data breach that included the plaintiff’s medical 
information is responsible for at least a certain amount of nominal harm resulting 
 
action-claims-for-alleged-identity-theft-07-26-2007/; Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 
705, 706-07 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 
 180. Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 910 (N.D. Cal. 2009) aff’d, 380 F. App’x 689 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 548 U.S. 398 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 
U. S. 139, 140 (2010) (slip op., at 7)). 
 185. See Sean McIntyre, Deeper Dive: Clapper Divide Expands In Data Breach Cases, DATA 
PRIVACY MONITOR (June 13, 2017), https://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/privacy-litigation/deeper-
dive-clapper-divide-expands-in-data-breach-cases/. 
 186. Comstock, supra note 176 (“I know there have been a couple of class action suits filed, but that 
law is not at present well developed in terms of the private right of individuals whose private health 
information has been disclosed. And the issue there is ‘What’s the damage?’ You have to show damage, 
and it’s very nebulous.”). 
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from their information being breached.  Covered entities and business associates 
should only be able to overcome this presumption by showing that they complied 
with reasonable cybersecurity safeguards.  Such a scheme would likely 
incentivize covered entities and business associates to promulgate stricter 
security rules to prevent successful lawsuits against them. 
Covered entities and business associates will probably argue that a private 
right of action with a rebuttable presumption against them could result in medical 
doctors and insurance companies leaving the field because of increased liability.  
Also, they could argue that allowing for a private right of action would increase 
health care costs for everyone.  However, the burden of the cost in the current 
framework is on patients who are ill-equipped to protect themselves- both 
financially and because they generally have little to no control over how health 
care companies secure their PHI. 
v. HHS Should Provide Security Ratings for Covered Entities and Business 
Associates 
HHS should provide security ratings for business associates that provide 
underlying technical security controls for covered entities.  This would allow 
covered entities to better determine the level of security they are getting from 
providers and analyze that against the cost for services.  Specifically, rating cloud 
computing options could be very beneficial to covered entities who use a cloud 
computing architecture because “more than 13% of cloud services used in the 
healthcare industry are considered high‒risk; 77% are at medium risk.”187  
ONCHIT provides a list of accredited EHR products.188  If EHR systems were 
also rated based on cybersecurity capabilities, covered entities could make better, 
more informed decisions when selecting EHR systems. 
Also, HIPAA should consider rating covered entities and publishing such 
information.  With a simple A-F cybersecurity rating mechanism, consumers 
could take cybersecurity information into account when selecting medical 
providers or health plans.  The federal government could require that covered 
entities and business associates post their cybersecurity rating both on company 
websites and in conspicuous locations in health care facilities.  If cybersecurity 
proves to be a major concern for many patients, such a rating system might 
incentivize covered entities and business associates to improve their security 
posture.  Without such knowledge in the current environment, there is decreased 
incentive for covered entities and business associates to fund cybersecurity 
measures. 
 
 187. Paganini, supra note 35.  
 188. See ONCHIT, Comprehensive List of Certified Health Information Technology, 
http://oncchpl.force.com/ehrcert (last visited Apr. 29, 2016). 
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vi. HHS Should Provide Basic Automated Security Testing and Penetration 
Tools to Covered Entities and Business Associates 
If HHS is not already doing so, it should provide some form of automated 
testing and penetration tools to covered entities and business associates.  Such 
automated testing should be user-friendly and require as little technical 
knowledge as possible to decrease technical costs to health care providers.  Such 
automated testing should also provide detailed implementation information 
about how to fix identified security issues.  The provided penetration tools should 
probably not be any more sophisticated than free penetration tools available 
online in order to prevent illicit use of such tools by nefarious actors.   
If not already a part of HHS’s cybersecurity alerts, HHS might also consider 
creating a more sophisticated automated test suite or penetration tools that the 
government could run to alert covered entities/business entities of known 
security vulnerabilities.  HHS might want to consider including such test suites 
as part of ONCHIT’s EHR accreditation process. These more complex tools 
should probably not be provided to covered entities or business associates if 
those tools could be used by cybercriminals to more effectively hack networks. 
vii. Regulations to Reducing Unnecessary Data Collection Could Improve 
Security 
Medical providers might be able to reduce the harm caused by PHI theft by 
reducing the amount of unnecessary personally identifiable data collected and 
stored by EHRs.  In particular, covered entities could stop making it a practice 
to require patients to disclose their social security number or date of birth.  Also, 
although it might be possibly more challenging administratively, medical 
providers could make it a practice to not store patient bank account and credit 
card information for future use. 
C. Involve Cybersecurity Elements and Infrastructure in Emergency Planning 
Efforts 
Emergency planners should consider emergency situations where basic 
infrastructure, such as the power grid or telecommunications equipment, is 
unavailable.189  PPD-21 specifically requires emergency managers to plan for a 
power grid outage.190  Many covered entities already have several forms of 
mitigation, such as backup power supplies and generators.  During a massive 
public health emergency; however, hospitals can be beyond surge capacity and 
such mitigation measures might not be enough to address many patients’ 
 
 189. Fahrenholz et al., supra note 53. 
 190. See Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, supra note 147. 
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needs.191  As part of this planning effort, cybersecurity experts, utilities, and 
telecommunications operators should help in providing insight.  Because 
telecommunications, utilities, and covered entities are typically privately owned, 
it is sometimes difficult to get input from such stakeholders.  The government 
should incentivize these private companies to participate in such planning as 
much as possible to provide optimal solutions. 
In order to optimally utilize resources in emergency planning efforts, the 
government should (1) provide first responders with meaningful cybersecurity 
training that they can use in planning with private infrastructure companies and 
(2) declassify relevant portions of the SNRA and similar documents that local 
emergency responders could use in planning for all four stages of the emergency 
management cycle. 
i. Federal and Local Governments Should Provide More Appropriate 
Cybersecurity Training to Emergency Responders 
Having FEMA develop meaningful cybersecurity training for emergency 
managers might enable them to better prepare for, mitigate from, respond to, and 
recover from an emergency brought on by a cybersecurity attack.  In FEMA’s 
National Response Report, emergency managers have consistently ranked 
cybersecurity as the core capability that needs most improvement.192  Some 
viable cyberattack planning considerations could be identified at the federal level 
and promulgated to local emergency managers.  The government should help the 
public respond to and recover from attacks to critical infrastructure.  Cities 
should consider alternative ways that citizens can contact first responders during 
a major telecommunications outage and options that they have in the event of a 
power grid emergency. Emergency managers should develop alternative 
operating procedures for use during critical infrastructure outages and should 
consider the special needs of disabled citizens or those with medical equipment 
that relies on electricity. 
 
 191. DELIA, supra note 22 at x (“On 47 days in 2005, more than 95% of all maintained beds in the 
state were occupied. This number increased from 29 days in 2004 and 11 days in 2003. On these days, 
there would be almost no immediate surge capacity available to respond to a major emergency such as a 
natural disaster or terrorist attack without displacing existing patients. On more than ¾ of the days in 2003 
through 2005, the state had less than 500 empty staffed beds available per million residents, which is a 
surge capacity benchmark developed by the federal Health Resources and Services Administration.”). 
 192. See DHS, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS REPORT (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/1432751954859-
fcaf2acc365b5a7213a38bbeb5cd1d61/2015_NPR_508c_20150527_Final.pdf. 
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ii. The Government Should Declassify Additional Portions of SNRA and 
Similar Documents, as Applicable, to Share with Emergency Responders, Public 
Health Officials, and Health Care Providers 
Considering the extensive resources that went into developing the SNRA, 
it would be helpful to declassify information derived from that study that could 
help emergency managers in planning for critical infrastructure outages.193  
Obviously, such information should only be declassified to the extent that it 
would not damage national security by providing salient information about the 
country’s weaknesses to adversaries.  Because the SNRA includes inputs from 
multiple high-level officials, it may be a strong starting point for emergency 
managers in developing local plans for related emergencies.194   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Cybercriminals will continue to attack the country’s medical infrastructure 
unless cybersecurity regulations and policies are updated.  New legislation and 
regulations should focus on providing covered entities and private critical 
infrastructure companies with incentives to create secure and resilient networks.  
Unfortunately, people whose medical information is stolen suffer most from 
these attacks, and typically they are the most ill equipped to recover from them.  
Currently, the government does not provide consumers with the information 
necessary to select covered entities or business associates based on their 
cybersecurity posture. Therefore, future legislation and regulation should focus 
on providing cybersecurity information to consumers, incentivizing better 
security practices, and planning emergency management efforts for large-scale 
cybersecurity attacks. 
 
  
 
 193. See DHS, THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF PPD 8: A 
COMPREHENSIVE RISK-BASED APPROACH TOWARD A SECURE AND RESILIENT NATION 1 (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1854-25045-
5035/rma_strategic_national_risk_assessment_ppd8_1_.pdf (“As part of the effort to develop the National 
Preparedness Goal and identify core capabilities, the Secretary of Homeland Security led an effort to 
conduct a strategic national risk assessment to help identify the types of incidents that pose the greatest 
threat to the Nation’s homeland security. Representatives from the offices of the Director of National 
Intelligence and the Attorney General, as well as other members of the Federal interagency, supported this 
effort.”). 
 194. Id. 
CASHWELL FINAL FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2018  12:27 PM 
58 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 21:029 
 
